Expectations and riskiness of future earnings are crucial determinants of individuals' intertemporal choices. Yet, the empirical literature lacks reliable measures of the distribution of future income. Lacking direct observability, the latter is usually estimated inferring moments of the distribution from income realizations on panel data. In this paper we rely instead on subjective expectations available in the 1995 Survey of Household Income and Wealth, a large random sample representative of Italian households. The survey elicits information on the distribution of future earnings and the probability of employment in a very simple and parsimonious way. Based on the responses, we estimate the individual distributions of expected earnings conditional on working as well as unconditional. We can then relate various moments of these distributions to demographic and economic variables observable in the cross-section.
Introduction
Economists routinely propose models in which current decisions depend on expectations of future variables. For instance, theories of intertemporal choice posit that people react to the subjective expectation of future income. When the strong assumptions that lead to certainty equivalence are relaxed, theory also predicts that people respond to higher moments of the distribution of future earnings. The relevant moments are those of the subjective distribution of future earnings conditional on information available at the time the decisions are made.
Two approaches have emerged in the literature to extract these moments from observable variables. The most common approach relies on panel data that contain current and past realizations of income. This information allows the econometrician to infer expectations and possibly higher moments of the distribution of future earnings from past income realizations. However, the assumptions required by this procedure are very strong. For instance, it must be assumed that the econometrician knows the individual information set and the stochastic process that generates individual expectations. With few exceptions, empirical studies do not take into account conditional heterogeneity and assume that individuals have the same information set. Nevertheless, applied economists routinely estimate ARMA processes on income in panel data. It is an unhappy characteristic of economics that implausible assumptions and procedures get accepted for lack of sound alternatives.
A smaller strand of recent literature has proposed a different approach to estimate the moments of the distribution of future earnings.
1 This approach relies on survey questions, not retrospective data, to elicit information on the conditional distribution of earnings. Direct survey questions do not require the econometrician to know the variables that individuals consider in forming their expectations. In this paper, we use the information contained in the 1995 Bank of Italy Survey of Households Income and Wealth (hereafter, SHIW) to compute a conditional distribution of future earnings for each household in the sample. See Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1992) , Dominitz and Mansky (1997) and Das and Donkers (1997) . A comparison between this study and previous evidence is given in Section 2.
The paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, we consider that the distribution of future labor income results from three distinct elements: the probability of unemployment, the distribution of future wages and the distribution of unemployment compensation. Depending on the institutional features of the labor market, each of these elements may be more or less important in determining the overall distribution of future earnings. For instance, if job search is costless and wages and prices are fully flexible, the variability of future income depends only on that of wages; but if wages are sticky or fixed, income variability depends mainly on fluctuations in employment status. Previous studies concentrated on the distribution of income, neglecting the impact of unemployment and unemployment compensation.
Second, we study the determinants of various moments of the income distribution and of the subjective probability of unemployment. Understanding whether the moments of the subjective distribution can be predicted on the basis of observable variables is useful for identifying proxies for these moments in circumstances where no direct information on the distribution of future income is available, and for assessing the importance of accounting for conditional heterogeneity or failing to do so.
The determinants of the subjective unemployment probabilities are of interest in their own right, since they offer insights into the working of the labor market. The relation between the variability of future income to observable variables and an index of risk aversion available in the survey spot lights the problem of self-selection that plagues empirical studies.
In Section 2 we survey the literature based on direct questions on expectations of future income and describe the main characteristics of our sample. The survey questions we designed are extremely simple but yield powerful information about future earnings and employment prospects. In Section 3 we show how they can be combined to estimate the distribution of future income for each individual in the sample. In Section 4 we provide ample description of the characteristics of our individual income distributions and compare them with other countries. In Section 5 we relate the mean, the coefficient of variation and the subjective probability of unemployment to a set of demographic variables and labor market indicators. We also examine whether individuals that face lower income risk also are less risk-averse, using a proxy for risk aversion that is available in the survey. Section 6 checks the sensitivity of the results using different measures of location and dispersion. Section 7 summarizes our main findings.
Previous evidence and sample design
In order to derive empirical measures of subjective income expectations and income risk, one must design appropriate survey questions to characterize either the density or the cumulative distribution function of expected earnings. In the literature both approaches have been taken. Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1992) is based on survey questions posed in the 1989 SHIW eliciting information about the density of the income distribution. Recently, Dominitz and Mansky (1997) and Das and Donkers (1997) have followed the alternative approach; so does the design of the 1995 SHIW.
2 There is a trade-off between the two approaches: information on the density allows one to derive measures of income risk without making distributional assumptions, while questions about the cumulative distribution generally do require such assumptions but are easier for respondents to understand and thus probably less subject to measurement error.
The 1995 SHIW has data on income, consumption, financial wealth, real estate wealth, and several demographic variables for a representative sample of 8,135 Italian households (including 23,924 individuals and 14,699 income recipients). Interviews were conducted between May and October of 1996. Balance-sheet items are end-1995 values. Income and flow variables refer to 1995.
3 The survey also covers job search activity, hours of work, and labor force participation.
Most importantly from the point of view of this study, a special section of the survey was designed to characterize the distribution of future income and the probability of unemployment. To our knowledge, the only survey containing information on employment prospects is the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), conducted at the University of Michigan since 2 Other authors have instead relied on measures of income risk estimated on panel data from past earnings. We comment on this approach in Section 2.3.
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The main features of the SHIW, its sample design, interviewing procedure and response rates are described by Brandolini and Cannari (1994) . Details about the 1995 sample can be found in Banca d 'Italia (1997) . The dataset can be obtained by writing to: Research Department, Banca d'Italia, Via Nazionale 91, 00196 Rome, Italy.
1992
. 4 The main drawback of the HRS data is that respondents' age is deliberately restricted to the 51-61 range (in 1992), i.e. individuals approaching retirement for whom unemployment risk could be negligible or altogether absent. Explicitly considering unemployment probabilities at younger ages is important, because employment risk is one of the major determinants of future earnings prospects. Another drawback to HRS is that it has no questions about income expectations. In this respect, our data set is a unique source of information.
Unlike Dominitz and Mansky (1997) , the survey questions focus on individual earnings rather than households' disposable income. This avoids mixing labor income uncertainty and capital income uncertainty.
5 One possible drawback of choosing to focus on individual income is that a measure of uncertainty at the household level cannot be easily constructed in our data set, so that one has to rely on information on individual expectations to describe the behavior of the household. Another source of difference is that in the 1995 SHIW households report the distribution of after-tax income, rather than gross income as in Dominitz and Mansky (1997) .
Four questions on income expectations were asked of 4,799 individuals, or half the overall sample, after excluding the currently retired and people not in the labor force.
6 Both the employed and job seekers were asked to state, on a scale from 0 to 100, their chances of keeping their job (if already employed) or finding one (if unemployed) in the year following the interview. Each individual assigning a positive probability to being employed is then asked to report the minimum (y m ) and the maximum (y M ) income he or she expects to earn if employed, and the probability of earning less than (y m + y M )/2, the midpoint of the distribution of future earnings 4 The wording of the HRS question is as follows: "Sometimes people are permanently laid off from jobs they want to keep. On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 equals absolutely no chance and 10 equals absolutely certain, how likely is it that you will loose your job during the next year?". 5 We prefer focusing on earnings because it may be much more difficult for households to evaluate interest rate risk. One of the purposes of the survey questions was to allow for tests of precautionary saving. Interest rate risk has ambiguous effects on saving and can to a large extent be avoided by portfolio diversification. Thus measures of income risk that are based on the probability distribution of disposable income can potentially bias tests of precautionary savings. There are two focus sections in the 1995 SHIW, one on qualitative features respondents' jobs, the other on income and employment expectations. The selection of the two samples is based on the year of birth of the household head (even or odd), and is therefore random. conditional on working. For brevity, we refer to the latter as the partial distribution to distinguish it from the overall or total distribution. 7 The exact wording of the survey questions is given in the Appendix.
We show below how to combine the information derived from these four items to estimate expected earnings and their variance, both conditional and unconditional on working. We exclude 209 individuals who expected to retire within a year and other observations missing data for the construction of our measure of income risk. The final sample includes 4,205 individuals belonging to 2,607 households.
The distribution of future earnings
The expectation and the variance of future earnings depend on three variables: the distribution of future earnings conditional on being employed, unemployment benefits, and the probability of unemployment. Let f(y) be the probability of earning income y if employed in the year following the interview; we will refer to this distribution as the partial distribution and to its moments as the moments of the partial distribution.
8 Let (1−p) denote the probability of being employed in the year following the interview and w u the income earned if unemployed (received with probability p). In principle w u includes not only unemployment compensation, but also any other resources that are formally or informally transferred in case of unemployment.
The SHIW provides information on f(y) and p but not on w u . Based on the rules governing Italian welfare programs, however, with care we imputed a value for unemployment compensation to each individual in the sample. We used survey data and aggregate information to determine eligibility requirements and welfare benefits. The latter vary substantially across population groups. For instance, the self-employed and the long-term unemployed are not entitled to unemployment benefits. We assume that 7 Both distributions are conditional on information known to the individual at the time of the survey. What we term as the partial distribution, however, is the distribution that also conditions on working in the year following the survey.
people have point expectations about unemployment benefits. The imputation procedure is detailed in the Appendix. 
where y m and y M define the support of the probability distribution of future earnings. Equations (1) and (2) are the total mean and variance of the distribution of future earnings. The partial mean and variance can be immediately obtained setting p = 0 in (1) and (2).
Since we assume that unemployment benefits are non-stochastic, the partial variance (weakly) dominates the total variance, Var y (~) . The reason is that an increase in p signals an increase in the probability of receiving certain unemployment benefits rather than risky labor income, thus reducing the overall variability in expected income. To make equations (1) and (2) the survey provides only information on the support of the distribution and on the probability mass to the left of the mid-point of the income support, i.e. we only know Prob(y≤(y m +y M )/2) = π. We make two alternative distributional assumptions concerning f(y).
One possibility is to assume that y is uniformly distributed over each of the two intervals The cumulative distribution functions of the uniform and triangular distributions are shown in Figure 3 . The triangular distribution is a more plausible description of the probability distribution of earnings, because outcomes further away from the mid-point receive less weight. In our empirical analysis we use statistics computed according to the triangular distribution, but we also check the sensitivity of the results on the alternative assumption.
The parameter π provides an index of the asymmetry of the individual distribution, because the distributions are symmetric only if π=0.5. Figure 4 shows the histogram of this probability. For about 60 percent of the sample the distribution is asymmetric, equally divided between left and right asymmetry. Furthermore, even in those cases in which the partial distribution of earnings is symmetric, a positive probability of unemployment with a discrete fall in income may induce significant departure from symmetry in the total distribution. This suggests that the mean may not adequately capture the central tendency of the distribution of future labor income. In Sections 4 and 5 we characterize the individual distribution by the mean, the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation. In particular, the coefficient of variation is very convenient for comparing population groups or countries. In Section 6 we check the robustness of our results to alternative measures of location and dispersion that are more appropriate when the individual income distributions are not symmetric.
The empirical distribution of future earnings
The foregoing definitions allow us to compute the mean and variance of future earnings for each individual in the sample, and therefore to obtain a cross-sectional distribution of individual means and variances. The distributions are conveniently summarized in Table 1 by the coefficient of variation of future earnings, Cv(ỹ )=Sd(ỹ )/E(ỹ ).
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 refer to total earnings assuming, respectively, uniform and triangular partial distributions. In both cases, Cv(ỹ ) is right skewed, as shown by the positive difference between the cross-sectional mean (5.16 percent for the uniform and 3.68 percent for the triangular) and the cross-sectional median (3.65 and 2.61 percent respectively). The uniform distribution dominates the triangular: regardless of decile, the ratio between the deciles calculated under the two different distributions is about 70 percent. The coefficient of variation of the partial distribution is slightly higher than of the total, as shown in columns (3) and (4). As explained above, this depends on our assumption about nonstochastic unemployment benefits. The skewness of the partial crosssectional distribution of Cv(ỹ ) is slightly reduced with respect to the total distribution. Figure 5 displays the cross-sectional distribution of the probability of unemployment p. Strikingly, for more than half the sample the probability of being unemployed in the year following the interview is zero (the unemployed account for just 1.6 per cent, while the incidence among the employed is 76 percent), a signal of substantial rigidity in the labor market. On the other hand, only 3 per cent of the sample is certain not to be employed in the year following the interview. 10 For the employed p ranges from 5 to 10 percent at low levels of risk (when the partial Cv(ỹ ) < 0.02), and is as high as 30 percent at high levels of risk. This suggests that those who face a higher probability of unemployment also have high income risk when employed.
Our measure of risk can be compared with previous evidence for Italy. Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1992) use information from the 1989 SHIW to construct the partial Cv(ỹ ). In that survey respondents were asked a rather different set of questions about earnings prospects. They had to assign probability weights, summing to 100, to a set of intervals of income increases for the next 12 months.
11 By asking directly about this entire probability distribution, one can construct a measure of the subjective income variance without having to make explicit assumptions about functional forms. Dominitz and Mansky (1997) point out that questions about the density of future income are harder to understand than questions regarding the cumulative distribution. This is indeed a possible problem with the 1989 SHIW, where about one third of respondents report point expectations about income in the following year. Moreover, for the vast majority of households the income distribution is collapsed between two or at most three income intervals.
Since no question on employment prospects was asked in 1989, the proper comparison is with the 1995 partial distribution of future earnings. In 1995 the sample average of the Cv(ỹ ) computed under the triangular distribution is higher than in 1989 (3.6 percent as against 2 per cent), reflecting differences in sample design and risk across sample periods. In fact, the 1995 interviews were completed between May and October of 1996 (a recession year), whereas the 1989 interviews were completed in the spring of 1990, at the end of an upswing. Nonetheless, the Cv(ỹ ) in both years is fundamentally characterized by the small magnitude of income risk.
12 11 The wording of these questions and details about the construction of the variables are reported in Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1992) . 12 The small amount of ex ante uncertainty, as measured by the coefficient of variation, contrasts with measures of income risk obtained by regression analysis using panel data and assuming that earnings follow a univariate stochastic process (approximately 20 per cent in the United States, as reported by MaCurdy, 1982) . There are three possible explanations for the differences between the self-reported measure of income risk and the standard errors of earnings found in panel data regressions. Part of the variability in income in panel data is certainly due to measurement error and the failure to take proper account of unobserved heterogeneity. The time-series error of the earnings process estimated with panel data does not necessarily reflect the innovation faced by individuals, who consider a much larger set of variables than the econometrician and therefore might have superior information about their earnings prospects. Finally, in the absence of long
It is also interesting to see how our measure of income risk compares to measures for other countries. Figure 6 compares the sample distribution of the Cv(ỹ ) in Italy, the Netherlands and the United States. The US data were analyzed by Dominitz and Mansky (1997) using the Survey of Economic Expectations (SEE). Income risk for the Netherlands is computed by Das and Donkers (1997) using the VSB Dutch panel. In both countries, questions similar to ours are used, but with two important differences. The Dutch and US households are asked to report the probabilities of income falling below four thresholds (a given sequence in the SEE, equally spaced in the VSB), while in the SHIW there is only one threshold (the mid-point of the support of the income distribution). And the SEE and VSB refer to household disposable income, while the SHIW refers just to the labor income of the respondent.
With these caveats, the comparison in Figure 6 indicates that Italian and Dutch households perceive a similar level of risk, while US households appear to be much more exposed to income risk. In both Italy and the Netherlands 80 percent report a coefficient of variation below 6.5 percent, compared to just 24 percent in the US. This immediately suggests questions as to why perceived income risk differs so dramatically between Europe and the US. Does the difference mainly reflect differences in labor market institutions or in social welfare programs? And what are the implications for households' behavior? Extremely interesting as these questions are, pursuing them is beyond the scope of this paper. 13 panel data the cross-sectional dispersion of earnings and standard errors estimated by univariate earnings functions are more likely to reflect inequality rather than true ex-ante uncertainty. This is why we believe that estimates of income risk using survey questions are more reliable than panel data estimates.
13 Bertola and Ichino (1996) argue that labor market institutions are the main determinant of the degree of risk perceived at the individual level. They make a strong case that countries where labor markets are highly flexible (as in the US) exhibit high income and employment uncertainty and low unemployment, as opposed to countries with more rigid labor market institutions and wages (as in Italy and the Netherlands).
Income and unemployment risk by demographic group
The cross-sectional means of realized 1995 income, imputed unemployment benefits, expected income, the standard deviation of future earnings and its coefficient of variation by demographic group are reported in Table 2 . In all cases we use the triangular distribution. Statistics using the uniform distribution follow a similar pattern and hence are not reported.
Though income expectations and realizations refer to different years, 14 on average they are quite close (19.3 and 20.8 million lire at 1995 prices, respectively). A few groups expect income to be lower than in 1995, suggesting that not all respondents were optimistic. For instance, the elderly expect their income to fall. Employees of small firms (fewer than 20 employees) anticipate an 8 percent drop in income. The pattern of unemployment benefits across groups reflects Italian welfare legislation program: unemployed workers (i.e., those having lost jobs), public sector employees and employees of large firms are more likely to receive substantial income support.
The cross-sectional pattern of the coefficient of variation confirms that the self-employed report the highest risk, and public sector employees the lowest. Firm size reduces income risk, while active job seekers expect more volatile incomes than those who not currently searching. Finally, the young, residents in the South and women all face slightly higher than average risk.
Data on the probability of being unemployed in the coming year are presented in Table 3 , separately for those employed and unemployed in 1995. If workers are identical in all characteristics and unemployment were purely voluntary, one should observe no dramatic difference in unemployment probabilities between the two groups. But this is clearly not the case: the unemployment probability is much higher for the unemployed, suggesting strong state-dependence in employment status. Furthermore, there are also large differences within demographic groups, suggesting that layoffs are not generated by random draws, but strongly related to market and individual characteristics.
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With the exception of sex, health and job search status, the pattern of the probabilities by demographic group is similar, regardless of employment status. The probability is higher for the young, the less well educated, residents in the South, those with health problems, and those employed in small private firms. 16 The pattern of subjective unemployment probabilities when the sample is stratified according to current employment status and job search is interesting. Among the unemployed, active job seekers report a lower probability of remaining unemployed (62 percent) than non-searchers (68 percent); among the employed, the opposite holds (29 against 13 percent). One possible interpretation is that the unemployed who search are those with a reasonable chance of finding a job, while those who do not are discouraged by a high perceived probability of remaining unemployed anyway. This would be consistent with the presence of fixed costs of search. Alternatively, the unemployed who do search may report lower unemployment probabilities simply because their job search activity improves their employment prospects. As for the employed, it is likely that some of them search when still employed because they anticipate losing their job, and this is correctly reflected in the higher reported probability of unemployment.
One common objection to the use of income risk indicators in empirical tests of precautionary savings, such as occupation or sector, is that estimates can be biased by self-selection. That is, people in high-risk groups, such as the self employed or those with high earnings variance or high unemployment risk, may be less risk-averse and have accordingly chosen to 15 In a recent strand of the empirical literature a constant probability of unemployment in each period is used to simulate buffer-stock models of consumption choice over the life-cycle, assuming away conditional heterogeneity. The results in this section are strongly at variance with the assumption of a constant probability of unemployment.
16 Given the wording of the survey questions we cannot identify the retention rate (for the currently employed) or the arrival rate of job offers (for the unemployed). Blundell, Magnac, and Meghir (1997) show that the probability of being employed in the next period can be factored into the retention rate (or the arrival rate of job offers if unemployed) and the probability that the option value from employment exceeds the option value from unemployment. Lacking further information, the two factors cannot be separately identified except in trivial cases, for instance when the probability of being employed equals one.
belong to these groups. The effect of income risk on saving is consequently bound to be biased by the endogeneity of the indicator. To gauge the severity of this problem, we relate an indicator of risk aversion to the selfreported measure of employment and earnings risk. If individuals self-select into jobs according to their attitudes toward risk, their risk aversion should help predict the coefficient of variation of future earnings, after controlling for occupation and individual characteristics.
A question in the 1995 SHIW provides a unique opportunity to measure individual attitudes towards risk. Each household head was asked: "Suppose you have the opportunity to invest in a risky asset. There is an equal chance that you would gain 10 million lire (about $6,000) or lose everything. How much would you be willing to pay to purchase this asset?". The certaintyequivalent of such a lottery is 5 million lire, and we define as risk-averse those willing to pay strictly less.
In Table 4 we regress the log of expected income, the unemployment probability and the coefficient of variation of future earnings on the log of current (1995) income, a set of demographic and labor market characteristics and the indicator of risk aversion. As the risk-aversion question is put only to household heads and some observations are lost because of missing or zero current earnings, the regression sample includes 1,801 individuals.
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In column (1) we present the results of an OLS regression for the log of expected income. Unlike usual findings based on panel data (MaCurdy, 1982) , this regression strongly rejects the hypothesis of a unit root in labor income. While highly significant, the coefficient of current income is only 0.63. 18 . Most coefficients have the expected sign, but some are imprecisely estimated, essentially because the presence of current income absorbs the effects of other predictors of future income. For instance, after controlling for current income, public sector employment and self-employment do not help in explaining cross-sectional differences in expected earning.
In column (2) we focus on the subjective probability of unemployment. This probability has a strong inverse correlation with education and public sector employment and a positive correlation with employment by small firms. Residence in Southern Italy, where the unemployment rate is about 3 times the national average, has the expected negative effect. Age also has the expected effect (labor market experience and seniority should reduce the probability of involuntary lay-off according to standard last-in-first-out models of firing decisions), but the coefficient is imprecisely estimated.
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Self-employment has no significant effect on the probability of unemployment, as the risk of involuntary dismissal is nil. The coefficient of the indicator of risk aversion is negative and significantly different from zero, which tallies with the idea that risk-averse individuals self-select into occupations where unemployment risk is low.
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The last regression relates the coefficient of variation of future earnings to demographic and labor market characteristics. The results are presented in column (3) of Table 4 . 21 In general, we find earnings risk hard to predict. 22 Demographic variables (such as age, education and region of residence) have no explanatory power. Job characteristics, in contrast, appear to be good predictors of the coefficient of variation of income:
19 Alternatively, older workers may be seen as more productive, so that a seniority lay-off rule is rational for the firm. 20 The coefficient is similar in magnitude and statistical significance when we control for current employment status; but it is higher in absolute value and more precisely measured when the unemployed are excluded from the sample. 21 Results for the coefficient of variation of the total distribution might be driven by the probability of unemployment; for instance, differences in the variability of income for individuals working in different industries or in firms of different size might be obscured by the fact that unemployment risk is higher in some industries or firms and lower in others. However, the results for the partial distribution are almost identical to those for the total distribution; they are omitted for brevity. 22 The R 2 values of our regressions reveal that the econometrician would be more successful in predicting the mean than the higher moments of the distribution of future earnings. Individual heterogeneity in higher moments of the distribution of future earnings is therefore of paramount importance. However, what is unobservable to the econometrician is not necessarily so to the individual, who draws on a larger information set. Under some regularity conditions, the difference between the subjective expectation of the variable of interest (earnings or unemployment probability) and the predicted value of our OLS regressions can indeed be seen as the information discrepancy between the individual and the econometrician. earnings uncertainty declines with public sector employment and rises with self-employment. It is also higher among workers in smaller firms. This result, in conjunction with the finding that workers in small firms perceive a higher probability of unemployment, signals a positive correlation between firm size and job and wage security. Earnings uncertainty increases if the individual is currently searching for a job, probably reflecting future voluntary or involuntary mobility. We also find that the coefficient of variation of future income declines as current income rises. Finally, the sign of the coefficient of the indicator of risk aversion is consistent with the hypothesis that the more risk-averse choose low-risk occupations, but the size of the standard error prevents reliable inference. At face value, these results imply that in their occupational choice risk-averse individuals fear the probability of unemployment more than earnings variability. In other words, they are more willing to accept earnings variability (in a given job) than the risk of being laid off.
Robustness to different measures of location and dispersion
So far we have characterized the individual's distribution of future earnings by mean, variance and the coefficient of variation. Yet, in some circumstances the coefficient of variation earnings is not a good measure of income risk: for instance, the variance can be a very poor indicator of risk for excessively skewed individual distributions. 23 Likewise, the expected value of future earnings can be a strongly biased measure for the location of the distribution. As was shown in Section 4, there are significant departures from symmetry in both the total and the partial distributions of future earnings, which could make the validity of the results discussed in Section 5 questionable. Accordingly, we now check the sensitivity of the results in Table 4 using measures of location and of income variability more appropriate to asymmetric distributions. In particular, we focus on the median and the interquartile range.
Assuming that w u < y m < y M , the median of the total distribution of earnings is: 
Equation (4) can be used to calculate alternative measures of dispersion, such as the interquartile range.
We first comment on various measures of location and scale reported in Table 5 separately for the partial and the total distribution of individual earnings. For completeness, both cross-sectional means and cross-sectional medians of the relevant individual statistics are computed. 24 At least two noteworthy facts emerge. First, asymmetry in the individual distribution is indeed an issue: the subjective median dominates the subjective mean for both the partial and the total distribution, although correcting for unemployment reduces the average distance between the two. Second, while the two measures of relative income variability (the coefficient of variation and the interquartile range-median ratio) are quite similar for the partial distribution (although accounting for asymmetry suggests more risk), they differ quite substantially when unemployment is explicitly controlled for and cross-sectional means are used. This is because a few subjective distributions are outliers for the cross-sectional distribution: individuals with 24 More formally, and given heterogeneity, there are N subjective distributions of future earnings (with N being the number of individuals). For each individual distribution, one can compute subjective measures of location and dispersion, such as the mean, the median, the variance and the interquartile range. Let us call one such statistics S i . A cross-sectional statistic is then a known function of {S 1 , S 2 , …, S N }; for instance, the cross-sectional mean is trivially given by S=N
low expected unemployment benefits and employment probabilities (at or below 50 percent) have medians (hence 25 th percentiles) equal to their unemployment benefits but very large 75 th percentiles values. Crosssectional medians by contrast are robust to the presence of such outliers: the interquartile range-median ratio displays a cross-sectional median of only 0.0452.
Our regression analysis focuses on the median of expected income, the interquartile range-median ratio, and the difference between median and expected income. We interpret the latter as an index of asymmetry of the total distribution. The results of these regressions are reported in Table 6 . Given the evidence of large asymmetry in the cross-sectional distribution of the interquartile range-median ratio, OLS is not appropriate; so we use LAD.
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In general, the results for the location of the distribution of future income are qualitatively similar to those set forth above when asymmetry is not controlled for (see column 1). However, when we focus on the parameter of scale of the distribution, i.e., the interquartile range-median ratio (see column 3), some differences do emerge. Unlike the symmetric case, the effect of demographic variables is measured a bit more precisely. Moreover, while the index of risk aversion is still an insignificant predictor of the location of the total distribution, it significantly does affect the scale: being more risk-averse results in less earnings dispersion. 26 Predicting the asymmetry of the subjective distribution is as hard as predicting the dispersion. Only job dummies and past income are significant determinants of the amount of skewness in the individual distribution. In particular, public sector employees reduces asymmetry, while self-employment increases it. Presumably workers in the public sector assign little weight to extreme earnings events, whereas the self-employed are more exposed to either catastrophic or extremely fortunate events.
Conclusions
In this paper we propose a new set of indicators of expected income and subjective income risk using the 1995 Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth. Their main advantage is that they are derived from simple yet powerful questions. The data permit the estimation of moments of the future distribution of income taking into account the probability of unemployment and the distribution of unemployment compensation. We can thus examine the entire conditional distribution of earnings, rather than focusing on just one aspect, like most of the empirical literature.
The first and second moments of the income distribution are then compared with available evidence for other countries and related to a set of demographic and labor market characteristics. We find that occupational characteristics (sector, industry, firm size and job search status) affect both the expectation and the variance of the subjective distribution of future earnings. Using subjective expectations, the evidence in favor of a unit root in earnings is weak at best: the elasticity of expected future earnings with respect to past earnings is only 63 per cent, much below that commonly estimated with panel data.
We also find that risk-averse workers appear to be willing to pay a premium to a risk-neutral firm in order to avoid undesirable wage or employment fluctuations. The empirical results suggest that risk aversion is related to unemployment risk but not to earnings variability. This is consistent with the hypothesis that those who are more risk averse selfselect into occupations where unemployment risk is low but that will tolerate some earnings volatility. Undoubtedly the concern for security is a factor in the traditionally long queue of Italians seeking civil service jobs.
Finally, we find that across demographic groups defined by exogenous characteristics (age, education, and region of residence), cross-sectional differences in future income variability are almost entirely accounted for, ceteris paribus, by differences in unemployment prospects, not wage fluctuations. This highlights the importance of accounting separately for employment risk and earnings uncertainty in tests of consumption behavior, portfolio choice or labor supply.
employed, and self-employed. In principle, first-job seekers are not entitled to benefits. However, they are often eligible for special welfare programs offering part-time jobs. Public expenditure on these programs is higher in the South, where youth unemployment is far worse than the European average. For first-time job seekers we impute, by region, an average benefit equal to the ratio between 1995 public expenditure on the program and the number of first-job seekers. Data are drawn from Alfredo Casotti and Maria Rosa Gheido (1997), "Lavori socialmente utili", Diritto e Pratica del Lavoro, 28. Rome: IPSOA.
The currently employed receive a compensation in case of temporary layoff. The amount of this compensation depends on gross labor income at the time of the lay-off and on firm size. Its duration varies by firm-size. Following current legislation, we use the following values: § for those working in firms with over 50 employees and earning a gross monthly salary above 2.5 million lire, unemployment benefits are set at 1.5 million lire a month, and are received for twelve months following the lay-off; § for those working in firms with over 50 employees and earning a gross monthly salary below 2.5 million lire, benefits are set either at 1.25 million lire monthly or 80 percent of gross salary, whichever is the less (duration is again 12 months); § for those working in small firms (under 50 employees), benefits are set at 30 percent of gross monthly income, and are received for 6 months.
With few exceptions, the self-employed and the long-term unemployed have no income support in case of unemployment. Since survey data do not allow us to identify these exceptions, we set unemployment benefits to zero for both the self-employed and the long-term unemployed. Since unemployment compensation does not enter the formula for the variance, the imputation procedure does not bias our results. Finally, we set unemployment benefits equal to minimum earnings if employed ( y m ) when the former exceeds the latter. 
The total mean and the total variance are computed using equations (1) and (2). Similarly, the median and the 25 th and 75 th percentile of the partial distribution are respectively: Statistics for the total distribution can be easily recovered from equations (3) and (4).
A4. The triangular distribution
If the distribution of expected earnings is triangular over the two intervals [ y m , ( y m + y M )/2] and (( y m + y M )/2, y M ], the probability mass to the left of the midpoint ( y m + y M )/2 is constrained to be equal to π (see Figure 2) . Thus, the density function is: 
Statistics of the total distribution are determined using (1) and (2) in Section 2. It is easy to show that the median and the 25 th and 75 th percentile of the partial distribution are given by, respectively: Again, the statistics of the total distribution can be computed using equations (3) and (4). Note: Entries refer to the probability of being unemployed in the year following the interview. All means are computed using sample weights. Note: All regressions include a constant. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Note: Means, medians, standard deviations and percentiles are expressed in 1995 thousand lire. All statistics are computed using sample weights. Note: For the interquartile range-median ratio, columns (2) and (3) report OLS and LAD estimates, respectively. All regressions include a constant. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. .4
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1 Note: Data for the United States refer to the 1993 Survey of Economic Expectations (SEE) and are drawn from Dominitz and Manski (1995) , Table 4 . Data for the Netherlands refer to the 1995 VBS-Panel and are drawn from Das and Donkers (1997) , Table 2 , column 6. The coefficient of variation for the 1995 SHIW is computed assuming that the distribution function is triangular.
